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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) play a signicant role in our critical infrastructure networks from
power-distribution to utility networks. e emerging smart-grid concept is a compelling critical
CPS infrastructure that relies on two-way communications between smart devices to increase
eciency, enhance reliability, and reduce costs. However, compromised devices in the smart grid
poses several security challenges. Consequences of propagating fake data or stealing sensitive
smart grid information via compromised devices are costly. Hence, early behavioral detection of
compromised devices is critical for protecting the smart grid’s components and data. To address
these concerns, in this paper, we introduce a novel and congurable system-level framework to
identify compromised smart grid devices. e framework combines system and function call
tracing techniques with signal processing and statistical analysis to detect compromised devices
based on their behavioral characteristics. We measure the ecacy of our framework with a
realistic smart grid substation testbed that includes both resource-limited and resource-rich
devices. In total, using our framework, we analyze six dierent types of compromised device
scenarios with dierent resources and aack payloads. To the best of our knowledge, the
proposed framework is the rst in detecting compromised CPS smart grid devices with system
and function-level call tracing techniques. e experimental results reveal an excellent rate
for the detection of compromised devices. Specically, performance metrics include accuracy
values between 95% and 99% for the dierent aack scenarios. Finally, the performance analysis
demonstrates that the use of the proposed framework has minimal overhead on the smart grid
devices’ computing resources.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure networks such as utility, production, and distribution systems
are pillars of any nation and economy. ey depend on intelligent and advanced
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) to guarantee the ecient and reliable delivery of the
data generated within these networks. ese vital delivery systems have recently
been going through a massive eort to modernize their CPS infrastructure.
In the specic case of the power grid, a substantial eort has already been made
to modernize the traditional decade-old grid to the next generation of technology,
i.e., smart grid. e core concept of the smart grid relies on the integration of the
underlying electrical distribution with two-way communications capabilities between
the smart CPS devices in the grid. e uses of CPS devices in the grid allows new
functionalities and state-of-the-art computing systems for the smart grid infrastructure
over the traditional power grid [86]. Nonetheless, new security concerns stem from
the use of CPS devices by the modern power grid.
Indeed, with all its dependency upon device operations and communications, the smart
grid is highly vulnerable to any security risk stemming from devices. Notably, the use
of compromised devices can wreak havoc on the smart grid’s critical functionalities
[18, 65] and can cause catastrophic consequences to the integrity of the smart grid
data and operations. Recent examples like the Stuxnet and Sandworm worm aacks
[23, 29, 70] have proven that compromised devices represent a serious threat to the
smart grid. Specically, in the case of Stuxnet, the worm rst targeted computers
controlling Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)), to then change the conguration
of the PLCs and cause the uranium centrifuges to behave erratically [52]. e same
way, in the case of Sandworm, the aack rst targeted computing systems using
the BlackEnergy Trojan [46] to gain control over Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)
and substation breakers to cause power blackouts [41]. Due to these real aacks,
understanding the behavior of the smart devices, particularly the compromised ones,
has become more critical than ever. Several government agencies focus their eorts
to protect the critical infrastructure using behavioral-based approaches [63].
In this work, we propose a congurable system-level framework to detect com-
promised devices performing unauthorized operations inside the smart grid [6, 47].
Specically, the proposed framework utilizes system and function call tracing tech-
niques, signal processing, and statistical analysis to detect compromised devices based
on their unexpected behavior. In order to test our framework, we designed a realistic
representative smart grid substation testbed in which generic CPS devices performed
essential operations conforming to the International Electrotechnical Commission
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61850 (IEC618501) [35–38] protocol suite. e proposed testbed includes both resource-
limited (e.g., RTUs, PLCs, and resource-rich (e.g., Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs),
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)) CPS devices. In the testbed, the devices use
open-source libiec61850 libraries [59] to exchange smart grid time-critical messages
using the GOOSE format [10].
In addition, the adversary model complies with the security requirements specied
by the standardization organizations [81] for the smart grid. In total, we consider six
dierent types of compromised devices dened by dierent combinations of device
computing resources and aack payloads.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our framework by detecting and analyzing
behavioral dierences between compromised and ground truth devices using three
dierent detection methods. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
framework achieves an excellent detection rate. Performance metrics reveal accuracy
values between 95% and 99% for the dierent types of devices and detection methods
analyzed. Additionally, detailed performance analysis shows minimum overhead on
the use of the smart grid devices’ computing resources (i.e., CPU and memory). On
average, memory and CPU utilization does not increase more than 0.03% and 1.9%,
respectively.
Contributions: e contributions of this work are as follows:
(1) We designed a congurable system-level framework that combines system and
function call tracing techniques with signal processing and statistical analysis
to detect compromised smart grid devices. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst work that utilizes these techniques in detecting compromised
devices in the smart grid.
(2) To test the ecacy of our framework, we designed a realistic smart grid sub-
station testbed that included both resource-limited and resource-rich devices.
ese devices followed a GOOSE publisher-subscriber communication model
using open-source libiec61850 libraries. e proposed testbed represents a
valuable congurable benchmark for this, and other research works on CPS
security via behavioral analysis.
(3) In the adversary model, we considered six dierent types of compromised
devices with dierent computational resources and aack payloads.
(4) We evaluated the performance of our framework by detecting behavioral
dierences between the compromised device and ground truth devices. We
obtained accuracy results over 95% and precision results over 93% for all
the dierent aacks scenarios and types of devices analyzed. ese metrics
demonstrated that the proposed framework is highly eective to recognize
compromised smart grid devices using behavioral analysis.
(5) Finally, our analysis shows that the proposed framework does not represent a
signicant overhead in terms of computing resources.
Organization: e remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the background information and some critical implementation assumptions. en, in
1IEC61850 is a protocol suite that denes the communication standards for electrical substation automation
systems [10].
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section III, we describe the aacker model. en, in Section IV, we detail the architec-
ture of the proposed framework. In section V, we analyze and discuss experimental
results, performance metrics, and benets of our work. Finally, Section VI presents
the related work, and Section VII concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we provide insights into the behavioral analysis of the smart grid
devices at the system level.
2.1 Overview of System-level Smart Grid Substation Architecture
e National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) denes the smart grid
as a set of seven dierent interconnected domains [64]. Specically, two of these
domains are responsible for the generation and transmission of electricity, while the
other four provide business, operations, and customer support. Finally, at the center
of the smart grid architecture, the distribution domain (i.e., smart grid substations)
acts as a communication and control hub for the entire infrastructure, which makes it
especially aractive to cyberaackers [86].
In Figure 1, we present a simplied version of the smart grid distribution domain
architecture. Here, three main operation layers can be highlighted [39, 42, 87]:
• Process Level: permits the data acquisition and control at the lowest level
of the smart grid substation architecture. e devices at the process level
(i.e., merging units) extract state information from sensors, transducers, and
actuators and deliver command controls from the upper layers.
• Bay Level: permits the two-way communication between the process level
and the upper operation layers of the smart grid substations. Here, Industrial
Ethernet switches interconnect dierent control and protection EIDs to allow:
(1) protection and control of the data exchanged between bay level and upper
and lower layers and (2) protection of the data exchanged between devices
located inside the bay level.
• Station Level: provides user interfaces and enable applications for engineering
and control of the lower layers. Here we can highlight operations from the
communication system, the time synchronization system, the substation data
collection and control, and servers and workstations.
e IEC61850 protocol suite enables the real-time communications between devices
from dierent substations levels (vertical communications) and devices within the same
level (horizontal communications) using Manufacturing Message Specication (MMS),
Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), and Sampled Measured Values
(SMV) messages [10, 72]. Specically, this standard includes many underlying protocol
stacks to support and monitor a variety of time-critical services. Indeed, IEC61850
supports real-time operations, abstracts services, and interoperability between devices
used in energy automation [37, 38].
2.1.1 Behavioral analysis of substation smart grid devices. For this work, we focus
on the behavioral characteristics of the smart grid substation devices while they
communicate and perform either intra- or extra-level operations (i.e., horizontal
and/or vertical communications) in the smart grid substation. We dene behavioral
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Fig. 1. System-level interaction of smart grid substation devices. The two-way communications
under protocol suite IEC61850 can be established both horizontally (between devices from the
same level) and vertically (between devices from dierent levels).
characteristics of devices at the system level as the eect of the device’s substations
activities on the device’s kernel. Let assume that there is a deviceO performing control
operation at the Bay level. ese operations can be represented as the set OP where:
OP = {OP0 ,OP1 ,OP2 , ...OPN }, (1)
then, we dene the system-level behavioral characteristic of O as the function set BC
due to the reection of OP at the device’s kernel level [68, 89], that is:
BC = fkernel ({OP }), (2)
In all the cases, we characterize the devices’ kernel activity while the devices perform
their regular smart grid substation operations. Indeed, utilizing BC for the compromised
device classication allows for a proper generalization of our framework so the proposed
solution can also be successfully applied in other CPS domains outside the smart grid.
2.2 Genuine smart grid devices
We consider a smart grid device as genuine when no hardware nor soware alter-
ation or tampering has been performed on the device before, during, or aer the
manufacturing process. To further characterize and identify genuine devices, we
dene the parameter Index of Likeness (ILI). e ILI computes the similarity between
individual operations Oi performed by a single device while executing a specic task
T in dierent time intervals. Similar modeling approaches have been utilized in the
literature to characterize CPS [13, 54]. e universe of operations performed by a
device to complete a task T at time instant t = 0 can be dened as:
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T (t = 0) = {∪∞i=0Oi : ∃Oi ∈ T }, (3)
and the value of ILI for dierent t can then be expressed as:
ρI LIt I LIt+i =
∑
OtOt+i − nOtOt+i
nsOt sOt+i
, (4)
where Ot represents the set of operations Oi performed by the device to complete the
task T at the time instant t and Ot+i represents the set of operations performed to
complete the same task T at the time instant t + i . In the same equation, n represents
the cardinality of O and sOt and sOt+i represent the standard deviation of O .
Based on our model, a genuine or ground truth smart grid device is expected to
have a high value of ILI on average. is assumption has been supported in the
literature by other research works that characterize Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
devices (including smart grid devices) as highly deterministic systems [17]. In general,
for processes running over time, ILI is expected to take values between 0 and 1: 0 is the
result of entirely uncorrelatedOi s and 1 is the result of remarkably high correlatedOi s.
For a more realistic analysis, our work considers some inherent level of randomness
within the device operations. is assumption prevents twoOs from being completely
identical even if one same device performs similar tasks repeatedly over time.
2.2.1 Ground-truth Devices. In the context of this work, ground truth devices
constitute particular cases of devices that are known as genuine. We assume full
availability to ground-truth devices from every device class present in the smart
grid. e proposed framework utilizes these ground-truth devices during its learning
process. In the next sections, we dene the practical values of ILI that allow for the
characterization of ground-truth devices.
2.3 Compromised smart grid devices
e smart grid (and other CPS) devices can be compromised either directly and
indirectly. e direct method occurs in cases where the devices are compromised
during any of the steps of the supply chain process [4, 40] or via insiders, by directly
changing the conguration of the devices or their executing apps. Here, the aackers
directly target the CPS devices without any other intermediate device. On the other
hand, indirect methods are most commonly used and usually require initial access to
the computing systems controlling the CPS devices in the network. Once the aacker
gains access to those computers, they can change the conguration and behavior of
the edge devices [79].
We envision that the proposed framework can be utilized to detect compromised
devices in both the supply chain and in the eld. For that reason, our work considers
that genuine devices can be compromised during any stage of the manufacturing and
application process. Specically for our analysis, we consider a compromised smart grid
device as a genuine device with some malicious function installed on it. e malicious
function can be due to compromised hardware or soware component [44, 75]. Also,
the malicious function is expected to change the basic operations of the genuine
device. In general, this function can be injected before, during, or aer the device’s
manufacturing process. In Listing 1, we show realistic samples of a compromised
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device due to code injection. In this specic example, the malicious functions aim to
(1) cause degradation on the device’s resources and (2) save critical data on a le to be
sent later to aackers.
Listing 1. Example of malicious code injected to compromised smart grid devices
1 void stress mem()
2 {
3 srand(time(NULL));
4 long size = rand()%2147483647;
5 malloc(size);
6 }
7
8 void save and send later (GooseSubscriber subscriber)
9 {
10 FILE ∗f = fopen("/root/baduser/data.dat", "a");
11 fprintf(f, "%" PRIu64 "\n", GooseSubscriber getCriticalValue(subscriber));
12 fclose(f);
13 }
To further describe the compromised devices, we recall Equation 4. Here, the set
of operations O is compromised with a malicious subset Om executed to perform
the malicious activity [45]. at is, for compromised devices, the malicious activity
impacts the value of ILI by inserting malicious operations Omi to O . Such operations
change the device’s kernel behavior (Equation 2) so additional function or system
calls are generated (see Listings 2 and 3). In general, the set Om is expected to follow
certain statistical distribution as detailed later in our adversary model. Finally, for
compromised devices, Equation 4 takes the form:
ρI LIt I LIt+i =
∑
OtOmtOt+iOmt+i − nOtOmtOt+iOmt+i
nsOt sOmt sOt+i sOmt+i
, (5)
where the term Omt represents the malicious operations executed at time t and Omt+i
represents the malicious operations executed at time t + i .
Listing 2. System calls extracted from a
genuine device
1 pthread detach
2 malloc
3 malloc
4 free
5 free
6 signal
7 malloc
8 malloc
9 free
10 free
11 .
12 .
13 .
14 .
15 .
16 .
Listing 3. System calls extracted from a
compromised device
1 pthread detach
2 malloc
3 malloc
4 malloc
5 malloc
6 open
7 free
8 free
9 signal
10 malloc
11 malloc
12 malloc
13 malloc
14 open
15 free
16 free
2.4 Challenges on the behavioral identification of smart grid devices
Our framework utilizes changes in kernel’s behavioral paerns to identify compro-
mised devices. ere are three main architectural challenges that our framework
needs to overcome:
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(1) Challenge 1: e device class needs to be considered. Dierent types of devices
are expected to have dierent behavior; however, similar devices can also
behave dierently based on their specic tasks. Such ambiguity can lead to
mistakenly identify genuine devices as compromised. For that reason, our
framework incorporates (1) device resources (e.g., CPU and memory), (2) type
of device, and (3) device task context into the analysis.
(2) Challenge 2: Device classes are very diverse. Device class classication would
represent an implementation challenge due to the high device diversity present
in the smart grid [64]. Additionally, aer the initial classication, the list of
devices would need to be checked periodically due to possible changes in
network topology or new devices added to the network.
(3) Challenge 3: Smart grid devices operations are not fully deterministic. OS opera-
tions possess some degree of randomness that reects on the device operation
list O . During the detection process, the framework needs to discriminate
between additional operations present in the call lists due to legitimate random
processes and real malicious activities.
2.5 Classes of smart grid devices
For this work, we group the smart grid devices into dierent classes. en, we expect
that devices from dierent classes have dierent behavior. To correctly group the
devices, we consider three main features that address the challenges above: device’s
computing resource availability, device’s type, and device’s task context.
Resource availability– we dene two dierent types of devices based on the avail-
ability of their computing resources: resource-rich and resource-limited devices.
• Resource-limited devices: these devices have simple hardware and soware
architecture. ey run with low-performance CPUs and have minimal memory
capability. In general, the randomness of the resource-limited devices’ kernel
behavior highly depends on their soware architecture[17]. Also, these devices
are built to execute specic tasks inside the smart grid network. Some devices
in this group are PLCs and RTUs.
• Resource-rich devices: these smart grid devices are close in conguration to
full-capacity computers. ey have a full Operating System (OS), faster multi-
core processors, and signicantly higher memory than the resource-limited
devices. is type of devices executes specialized tasks inside the smart grid
network. Some devices in this group are IEDs and PMUs.
Moreover, we group the devices depending on their specic application, brand, and
model. For instance, PMUs from the same model and manufacturer can be grouped
together while RTUs and PLCs are not considered of the same type. We consider
this classication because the devices from dierent classes have found to behave
dierently, even if they perform similar tasks.
Finally, the class-classication process of smart grid devices considers the device’s
task context. For our purposes, the task context involves the type of activity that
the devices are performing and their specic logical location inside the smart grid
network. at is, we consider that devices of the same type can behave dierently if
they are handling dierent types of data from dierent parts of the network.
8
In general, we consider that the devices perform similar and repetitive tasks over
time [17]. en, our framework takes advantage of this mode of operation to detect
compromised devices based on changes in their expected behaviour.
2.6 Open-source approach
Our smart grid testbed utilizes open-source libiec61850 libraries [59] to exchange
smart grid time-critical messages using the GOOSE format [10]. e use of open-
source soware provides some additional design advantages: (1) our solution is more
exible, (2) the framework is more open to customizations which translate on being
highly congurable, and nally, (3) our solution can be easily adapted to other open
standards which increases interoperability. erefore, to keep the proposed framework
open-source, we implemented our solutions on Linux-based systems. is approach
is considered realistic since a very high percentage of smart grid devices still utilize
some variant of Unix-based OS [69]. We believe that, due to the open-sourced and
congurable nature of our testbed, it constitutes an eective benchmark to test the
performance of this and other security tools designed to protect the smart grid, that
follows the behavioral analysis.
2.7 Extracting operations from smart grid devices
We utilize system and function call tracing techniques to extract the set of individual
operations O from the devices. ese operations are analyzed while the devices
perform specic smart grid tasks T . We combine function and system call analysis, so
the device’s activity is detailed from both kernel and application-level, which increases
the robustness of the framework. For aackers trying to exploit the calls to stealth
their activities, the inconsistencies between system and function calls triggered by the
same process can also indicate the presence of malicious activities. We take advantage
of the open-sourced Unix-based nature of our testbed to eectively utilize library
interposition and ptrace as system and function call tracing techniques, respectively.
Tracing system calls with library interposition– We use dynamic library interposition
(LI) since this is a general-purpose system call tracing method that can be applied
to most C-compiled programs [56]. LI takes advantage of the use of a shared object
dened inside the runtime library. is object is in charge of fetching the system calls
at the kernel level. At runtime, LI hooks this shared object to intercept the calls and
take control of the applications’ behavior.
Tracing function calls with ptrace– At the user level, we use Process Trace (i.e.,
ptrace), a popular Unix-based tool to trace function calls. Ptrace uses an external
process that acts as a parent for the C compiled program that wants to be traced. Once
the external process aaches to its child, the parent application has full control of
every time the traced application makes a function call.
Finally, for cases where the smart grid devices do not use Unix-based OS (e.g., Real-
Time Operating System (RTOS)), similar approaches are utilized to trace the system
and function calls. Similar hooking techniques are possible to use because these other
systems behave in similar ways as Linux since they are also POSIX-compliant OS. In
general, the tracing technique utilized for hooking into the system and function calls
is a congurable feature that depends on every specic application [56].
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3 ADVERSARY MODEL
Our adversary model considers, conforming to the NIST guidelines, three possible
threats in the smart grid that are directly related to the use of compromised devices [62]:
(1) reat 1 (Information leakage): the compromised device opens additional com-
munication channels to leak valuable smart grid information to the adversary
(another untrusted insider or outsider) in real-time.
(2) reat 2 (Measurement poisoning): the compromised device generates fake
data that can be used to poison the real status of the smart grid.
(3) reat 3 (Store-and-send-later): the compromised device stores information in
hidden les that are recovered later by an aacker.
Based on these three well-dened threats and considering both resource-limited and
resource-rich smart grid devices, we further dene six dierent types of compromised
devices as part of the adversary model:
(1) Compromised Device 1 (CD1): the resource-limited device creates additional
instances of the IEC61850 GOOSE publisher object and starts leaking informa-
tion through unauthorized communication channels.
(2) Compromised Device 2 (CD2): the resource-limited device allocates small and
unauthorized amounts of memory to create fake data and poison real mea-
surements.
(3) Compromised Device 3 (CD3): the resource-limited device creates unauthorized
hidden les to store critical information which is retrieved later by the aacker.
(4) Compromised Device 4 (CD4): the resource-rich device creates additional in-
stances of the IEC61850 GOOSE subscriber object and starts leaking informa-
tion through unauthorized communication channels.
(5) Compromised Device 5 (CD5): the resource-rich device allocates small and
unauthorized amounts of memory to create fake data and poison real mea-
surements.
(6) Compromised Device 6 (CD6): the resource-rich device creates unauthorized
hidden les to store critical information which is retrieved later by the aacker.
A summary of the adversary model, its impact on device resources, and the targeted
security services of such aacks in the smart grid infrastructure are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Threats to the Smart Grid Devices.
Adversary Model
Name
CPS Device
resource availability Computing resources impacted Security services compromised
CD1 Limited Memory, CPU, communications Condentiality
CD2 Limited Memory, CPU Integrity
CD3 Limited Memory, CPU Authenticity, condentiality
CD4 Rich Memory, CPU, communications Condentiality
CD5 Rich Memory, CPU Integrity
CD6 Rich Memory, CPU Authenticity, condentiality
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We also assume that the compromised devices perpetrate their aacks following a
Poisson distribution. Poisson allows for randomly and eciently spacing the aacks
and constitutes a valid model to emulate the randomness of such events [71].
e behavior of the compromised device is modeled as follows. Consider t=[0,T ],
the communication interval between the two smart grid devices. e probability of
having an aack from a compromised device CDi ∈ {CD1,CD2,CD3,CD4,CD5,CD6}
can be expressed as:
Pcd =
λke−λ
k! , k ∈ R, (6)
where λ is the average number of aacks in the interval of time t and k is the total
number of aacks in the same interval.
4 OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the proposed framework to detect compromised devices in
the smart grid. Also, we present the details of our detection approaches and decision
algorithm. Figure 2 depicts the general architecture of the framework. As discussed
before, the main goal of the framework is to decide if an unknown smart grid device
is genuine or compromised [53]. For this work, the term unknown refers to the level
of uncertainty regarding the smart grid device being compromised or not. Initially,
as part of the learning process, a ground-truth device from a specic device class is
evaluated to generate its corresponding device-class signature or Ground-Truth Prole
(GTP). is signature contains behavioral proling information from the device and
is utilized to decide whether an unknown device from the same class is genuine or
compromised. Once the signature is obtained, it is stored in the Ground-Truth Proles
Database. In our implementation, we dene a separate service to execute the learning
process. Such a service separation permits the generation of new signatures every time
that new devices join the network. Also, an independent learning process guarantees
the replacement of old signatures every time that known devices assume new roles in
the smart grid network.
e second part of the framework (also known as detection process) starts by extract-
ing a similar proling signature from the unknown device. Here, we assume that we
have enough information to classify the device into some specic device class. en,
three dierent detection methods are applied to compare and correlate the unknown
signature to the corresponding GTP from a similar device class stored in the database.
Comparison and correlation results are then used to remove uncertainty and decide if
the unknown device has been compromised or not.
We envision the proposed framework as a secured, centralized, and supervised agent
virtually located inside the smart grid network. ere are several advantages from this
implementation model; rst, our framework would be compliant with the security
challenges of the smart grid [31, 32, 42]; second, a centralized solution represents
a beer option to monitor remotely-located devices from dierent networks; and
third, a supervised agent allows for monitoring group of devices without degrading
or interrupting critical tasks inside the smart grid. Figure 3 depicts a simplied
implementation example of our framework. Here, IED devices exchange information
between dierent substation level networks while a detection agent is monitoring them.
Inside the devices, a lightweight scheduler (sch) runs parallel processes at the kernel
11
System Call Lists
Function Call Lists
ILI Calculation
Compromised 
Device?
Data Collection
Data Processing
Decision
Data Collection
Ground-Truth 
      Profiles
     Database
Genuine 
Device
Compromised 
Device
Yes
No
System Call Lists
Function Call Lists
Call Comparison
IOC-simple
IOC-advanced
Data Processing
Ground-Truth
       Device
Unknown
   Device
Fig. 2. Configurable framework proposed to monitor and detect compromised smart grid
devices. The learning process creates signatures based on ground-truth devices that are utilized
later to decide on potentially-compromised devices.
level to hook into the devices’ tasks and extract behavioral information. e collected
information is sent to the server along with specic device class information using
secure TCP-IEC61850 channels via either proxy or VPN-tunnel protected (depending
on the smart grid device capability). en, on the server-side, every scheduled action
is processed using either priority or rst-in-rst-out (FIFO)-based queues. e priority
is assigned depending on the device class and may also regulate the frequency of the
scheduler’s execution. For every detection process, the server executes queries to the
GTP database using the device class ID and receiving the corresponding behavioral
signature. Finally, the server correlates the scheduler data with the stored signature
and decides on the devices as being compromised or not.
4.1 Probability of detecting a compromise smart grid device
In Section 3, we presented the probability of having a specic aack during a time
interval t , considering the device is compromised. In this section, we formally describe
the probability of detecting such aacks by using the proposed approach. To generalize,
we consider that the statistical relationship between the two discrete random variables
X and Y that represent the ground-truth signatures and the timed operation of the
unknown smart grid devices follow a bi-variate distribution B. From here, we assume
that the probability of having a particular specic sequence of calls in the GTP is P(X ).
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Fig. 3. Example implementation of the proposed framework.
e same way, we assume a specic sequence of calls extracted from the unknown
device with probability P(Y ).
When an aack occurs, and it is detected, the expected value E(X ) and E(Y ) of the
random variables representing both the GTP and the unknown device call list are
P(X ) and P(Y ), respectively. From here, we can determine the varianceV of the aack
indicator2 ϕx and ϕy from both the GTP and the unknown call lists as:
Var (ϕX ) = E(ϕ2X ) − E(ϕX )2 = P(X )(1 − P(X )), (7)
Var (ϕY ) = E(ϕ2Y ) − E(ϕY )2 = P(Y )(1 − P(Y )). (8)
We directly establish the statistical correlation between the random variable X and
Y as the co-variance of these aack indicators:
Cov(ϕX ,ϕY ) = E(ϕXϕY ) − E(ϕX )E(ϕY ),
= E(ϕX∩Y ) − E(ϕX )E(ϕY ),
= P(X ∩ Y ) − P(X )P(Y ).
(9)
en, we can dene the correlation between ground-truth device signatures and
the unknown smart grid devices based on the probability of detecting the aacks.
ρ(ϕX ,ϕY ) = P(X ∩ Y ) − P(X )P(Y )√
P(X )(1 − P(X ))P(Y )(1 − P(Y ))
,
=
(P(X |Y ) − 1)P(Y )√
P(X )(1 − P(X ))P(Y )(1 − P(Y ))
,
(10)
2An aack indicator is represented by the value of the random variable that would indicate the presence of
an aack.
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where P(X |Y ) represent the conditional probability of detecting an aack on a smart
grid device aer assuming a ground-truth signature from the same device class has
been found. In general, we describe the successfulness of the proposed detection
approach to be the jointly bi-variate variable (Xi ,Yj ) with probability of occurrence
P(Xi > X j |Yi > Yj ) for any pair of calls i , j.
4.2 Learning Process
e primary goal of the learning process is to populate the Ground-Truth Proles
Database that contains all the GTPs from device classes in a specic smart grid
network region. e execution of the learning process solves the rst two architectural
challenges of our framework described in Section 2. e learning process classies
the ground-truth devices into device classes and keeps the GTP database up-to-date.
For every dierent class of devices, the learning process performs two specic tasks:
(1) GTP data collection and (2) GTP data processing.
GTP Data Collection– this stage applies library interposition and ptrace to extract
the lists of system and function calls, respectively. ese operations are performed
while the ground-truth devices execute regular smart grid substation tasks T . For
every dierent device class, specic tasks are repeatedly executed over time while the
framework hooks every iteration. As a result, for every iteration of T , the learning
process generates new lists of system and function calls from the ground-truth device.
In the end, the data collection process generates a set of system and function call lists.
Every list contains detailed information about the specic operations that the devices
executed at both the kernel and the user level in every dierent run of T .
GTP Data Processing– the data processing stage calculates the ILIs for every dierent
ground-truth device class. e concept of ILI introduced in Section 2 evaluates how
much deterministic the performance of a ground-truth device is over time. e more
deterministic, the higher the ILI value and the more suitable the ground-truth device
is to obtain its GTP. In total, the framework calculates two dierent values of ILIs, one
from the set of system call lists and one from the set of function call lists, respectively.
To successfully calculate the ILIs, the framework assigns a dierent weight δi to every
dierent type of system or function call in the order that they appear. e assignment
of δi weights constitutes another congurable feature of our framework. is can be
done randomly (the weights are considered normally distributed for simple processes
where the dierent system or function calls have the same level of impact on the
completion of the task T ) or by following a specic assignment criterion (adaptive
assignment). e adaptive assignment depends on the importance of the specic calls
and the type of application that is being evaluated. As a result of the assignment step,
the framework generates a random variable R that takes values between δmin and
δmax . is variable describes the behavior of O for every dierent system or function
call list. Finally, the framework calculates the ILIs using the Equation 4. In the end, the
ILI values are compared against a congurable threshold σ . Initially, the framework
selects an initial value for the threshold based on the device class, and then it continues
adjusting this value until the average performance reaches the desired target value
for that specic class. If both ILI values are above σ , the GTP is accepted and stored
in the database.
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Equation 11 represents the general format of the GTP used in our work. e nal
prole contains information about the device class (DeC), the entire set of system and
function call lists (SCL), and the threshold σ . At the end of the learning process, the
Ground-Truth Proles Database contains all the possible signatures that characterize
the dierent device classes within a specic smart grid network region.
GTP = {DeC, SCL,σ }, (11)
4.3 Detection Process
e main goal of the detection process is to use the prole information stored in
the Ground-Truth Proles Database to determine if the unknown devices are being
compromised or not. is process performs three main tasks:
(1) Data collection: this step follows almost the same sequence of operations
detailed in the learning process. However, this time, the framework obtains
the call lists from a single execution of T on the unknown devices from the
smart grid networks. NoT task is xed for computing purposes nor is repeated
over time.
(2) Data processing: constitutes the core of the detection process. In this step,
the framework combines three dierent detection mechanisms to detect com-
promised devices. e application of every detection approach is decided
on-demand, which has a positive impact on reducing the total overhead intro-
duced by our framework.
(3) Decision: nally, the decision algorithm processes the results from data collec-
tion and processing to decide if the unknown device is genuine or compro-
mised.
In the following, we provide details about the three detection mechanisms.
4.3.1 Detection mechanisms. Our framework implements three dierent detection
mechanisms. To utilize computational resources eciently, the detection mechanisms
are applied orderly on-demand. at means, our framework utilizes each detection
approach in an ordered fashion, and it always uses the best eort to make a nal
decision by applying the minimum number of detection steps.
System and Function call list comparison– e simplest detection approach directly
compares the SCL from the GTP to the system and function call lists extracted from
the unknown device. e comparison schema considers the type and amount of
system and function calls in both GTP and the newly extracted lists. is mechanism
is implemented, as shown in Equation 12. Specically, the comparison approach
generates a call vector that contains the total number of dierent calls extracted from
the unknown device of class c and normalized against the termGTP(c ; SCL). Equation
12 details this process:
call vector = { unkc0
GTPSCL0
,
unkc1
GTPSCL1
, ...,
unkcn
GTPSCLn
}, (12)
where the term unkc0 refers to the amount of system or function calls of type 0
extracted from the unknown device and the term GTPSCL0 refers to the amount of
system or function calls of type 0 extracted from the GTP of the same device class. As
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inferred from Equation 12, call vector’s items of value 0 represent types of calls that
are present in the GTP SCL but not in the lists of calls acquired from the unknown
device. On the contrary, call vector’s items of value∞, represent calls extracted from
the unknown device, but that cannot be found in the corresponding GTP. In general,
the execution of this rst detection approach is very light in terms of computing
resources.
Index of Correlation Simple– A second detection mechanism calculates the statistical
correlation between call lists from the unknown device and the GTP. In this case, in
addition to the type and amount of calls, the framework considers the order in which
these calls are being triggered. e result from calculating such statistical correlation
is known as Index of Correlation simple (IOC-simple). IOC-simple is similar to the
ILI value obtained during the learning process. e main dierence between both is
that IOC-simple rst determines the statistical correlation between call lists from the
unknown device and the corresponding GTP class. Here, an assignment criterion is
also used to convert calls into specic δi values.
IOC − simpleOGTP ,Ounk =
∑
oGTPounk − noGTPounk
nsoGTP sounk
, (13)
where oGTP represents the set of individual calls in the GTP and ounk represents the
set of individual calls extracted from the unknown device.
Index of Correlation Advanced– As mentioned in Section 2, one should not expect
smart grid devices to perform operations in a completely deterministic paern. is
limitation exposes the third architectural challenge of our framework (see Section 2)
since legitimate random operations can be mistaken as compromised behavior. To
overcome this constraint, we further apply a more advanced IOC calculation (IOC-
advanced). In IOC-advanced, our framework combines the values from Oiunk to
Oi+hunk in Ounk . is operation results in a new random vector O ′unk smaller in size
and with a lower random component. e index h represents the number of individual
calls from the original list that are combined to create the new set O ′unk . is index
value h is proportional to the amount of randomness that one intends to remove from
the original Ounk and constitutes another congurable parameter in our framework.
ALGORITHM 1: Steps for the detection and decision processes.
1: compromised ← 0
2: U NK (DeCunk , SCLunk ) ← unknown device prole
3: GTP (DeCдtp, SCL, σ ) ← GTPs from Database
Detection:
4: if Exists DeCдtp & DeCunk == DeCдtp then
5: Calculate IOC
6: end if
Decision:
7: if IOC < β then
8: compromised ← 1
9: end if
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4.4 Decision Process
e nal step of our framework is the decision process. In this step, our framework
compares results from the three detection mechanisms against a threshold β to decide
if the unknown smart grid device is compromised or not. e value of β depends
on the device class, and it is always a function of the threshold σ determined during
the training process and stored in the GTP. e relationship between σ and β values
depends on the targeted accuracy performance for every device class. In general,
for devices with a higher deterministic behavioral paern, a higher value of β is
recommended. is design approach reduces the chances of false negatives during the
decision process. On the other hand, for devices with lower deterministic behavior,
a lower value of β may be sucient to reduce false negatives. Finally, note that this
decision threshold is also congurable. e initial value of β for every device class can
be adjusted to an optimal in real-time and while the framework monitors the devices
in the eld. In the next section, we analyze practical values of β for dierent types of
device classes.
Finally, Algorithm 1 details the detection-decision process of the proposed frame-
work. In lines 1, 2, and 3 the variables compromised , UNK , and GTP are initialized
with 0, the prole of the unknown device, and all the signatures from the database,
respectively. en, if a signature of the unknown device’s class exists (Line 4), the
values IOC (simple and advanced) are calculated in Line 5. Finally, if the value of IOC
is lower than the threshold β , the device is decided as compromised.
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed framework. In all the cases,
we obtain the results aer averaging 30 dierent runs of all the covered scenarios.
e scenarios include six dierent types of aackers as a result of the combination of
three dierent threats and two dierent types of devices based on their computational
resources, as described in Section 2. Also, we assume that the devices are correctly
grouped based on their type. Moreover, we measure the accuracy of our framework
with accuracy, precision, recall, and specicity metrics. Finally, we evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework in terms of its overhead (e.g., CPU utilization,
memory usage, and execution time).
5.1 Evaluation methodology with a realistic testbed
Our framework considers a realistic scenario from a smart grid substation. e
testbed’s conguration includes a publisher-subscriber two-way communications
conguration which sends and receives IEC61850-compliant GOOSE messages [10].
For this purpose, we utilize an open-source version of IEC61850 [59] protocol running
on Linux-based systems. Our resource-limited devices (i.e., GOOSE publishers) run
on a Raspberry Pi 2B, using Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) 32 bits architecture with
limited memory and CPU. On the other hand, the resource-rich devices (i.e., GOOSE
subscribers) run on a Linux Ubuntu 14.04 system with a more powerful CPU and
higher memory conguration. Finally, we utilize two dierent hooking techniques:
ptrace (that performs function call tracing) and library interposition (that performs
system call tracing). In our conguration, the publishers open the communication
session and wait for the subscribers to connect. Once the devices create and open
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the communication sockets, the publishers start sending GOOSE messages to the
subscribers every one second for a total time interval t of 60 seconds. Aer the t
seconds, the devices close their communication channels. For every compromised
device, the malicious threat is active n times during the communication sessions
as described in the adversary model (see Section 3). Finally, as detailed in Table 1,
compromised devices CD1, CD2, and CD3 correspond to resource-limited devices of
any class that have been compromised with reats 1, 2, and 3 respectively (see Section
3) and compromised devices CD4, CD5, and CD6 correspond to resource-rich devices
of any class that have been compromised with reats 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Despite
that the initial application of our testbed was intended to evaluate the performance of
the proposed framework in realistic scenarios, we believe that, due to its open-source
and congurable nature, it can also be used as a benchmark to eectively evaluate the
performance of other security tools applied to the smart grid.
5.2 Detection performance
In the following, we detail the performance of our framework aer applying the three
detection mechanisms proposed in Section 4.
5.2.1 System and Function call lists comparison. Tables 2 and 3 summarize some of
the system and function calls captured from the resource-limited and the resource-rich
devices, respectively. Columns Genuine and CDi (i: 1 to 6) in both tables list the
average rate of the system and function calls normalized against the GTP for genuine
and compromised devices, respectively.
Table 2. Normalized rate of the system and function calls captured aer using our framework to
detect compromised resource-limited devices (e.g., RTUs, PLCs): calls due to malicious activities
are grayed.
Call Tracing Technique Type of Call Genuine CD1 CD2 CD3
ptrace
brk ∼1 ∼1 6.7 ∼1
clone ∼1 12.5 ∼1 ∼1
close ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 3.2
f stat64 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 8.8
lseek ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1
mmap2 ∼1 2.4 4.4 2.4
mprotect ∼1 2.8 1.1 1
munmap ∼1 ∼1 2 13
open ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 5
r t siдprocmask ∼1 8.7 0.3 0.3
r t siдaction ∼1 ∼1 3 3
Interposition
close ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1
f r ee ∼1 3.2 ∼1 ∼1
malloc ∼1 3.3 ∼1 ∼1
memcpy ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1
memset ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1
mmap ∼1 12.5 ∼1 ∼1
mprotect ∼1 12.5 ∼1 ∼1
pthread create ∼1 12.5 ∼1 ∼1
sendto ∼1 4.3 ∼1 ∼1
siдnal ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
socket ∼1 ∼1 ∼1 ∼1
usleep ∼1 3.5 ∼1 ∼1
Values greater than ∼1 (marked in gray) in columns CD1 to CD3 and CD4 to CD6
represents extra system or function call activity due to the presence of malicious operations.
at is, extra call activity reveals the presence of malicious activity in the devices. One
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Table 3. Normalized rate of system and function calls captured aer using our framework to
detect compromised resource-rich devices (e.g., PMUs, IEDs): calls due to malicious activities
are grayed.
Call Tracing Technique Type of Call Genuine CD4 CD5 CD6
ptrace
brk ∼1 ∼1 8.3 ∼1
clone ∼1 23 ∼1 ∼1
close ∼1 6.5 6.8 6.75
f stat ∼1 12 12.5 12.25
mmap ∼1 4.1 6.64 2.6
mprotect ∼1 3.4 ∼1 ∼1
munmap ∼1 23 26 24
open ∼1 6.5 6.75 6.8
r t siдaction ∼1 8.3 ∼1 ∼1
Interposition
f r ee ∼1 15.6 ∼1 ∼1
malloc ∼1 15.6 ∼1 ∼1
memcpy ∼1 17.8 ∼1 ∼1
memset ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
mmap ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
mprotect ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
pthread create ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
pthreadd etach ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
r ecv f rom ∼1 15.7 ∼1 ∼1
siдnal ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
socket ∼1 24 ∼1 ∼1
usleep ∼1 15.7 ∼1 ∼1
can notice that, by using ptrace, our framework identied all cases of compromised
devices. On the other hand, in the case of library interposition, only CD1 and CD4
were properly detected. Also, the reader can notice that in the case of genuine devices,
the normalized rate values of system and function calls are very close to 1 in all the
cases.
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Fig. 4. Index of Correlation between GTP and unknown devices: (a) Resource-rich and resource-
limited devices aer applying our IOC-simple and (b) IOC-advanced results comparison be-
tween genuine and compromised resource-limited devices (using system call lists from library
interposition only).
5.2.2 IOC-simple. e rst detection approach could not identify reats 2 and
3 when the framework utilized library interposition. To overcome this limitation,
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we applied our second detection mechanism, IOC-simple. As explained in Section
4, to utilize the framework eciently, the framework applies the dierent detection
approaches in an ordered fashion as needed.
Figure 4(a) shows the results aer applying IOC-simple to system and function call
lists from GTP and compromised devices. In this gure, R-R refers to resource-rich
devices, and R-L refers to resource-limited devices.
e reader can observe that, by using ptrace, we obtain low IOC values (in the range
of 0.15 to 0.35) between function call lists from GTP and compromised devices. By
seing the correlation strength threshold to 0.6 (moderate to high correlation [71]),
our framework detects all the cases of the compromised devices. For the case of library
interposition, the framework performs very well for resource-rich compromised de-
vices. However, for resource-limited compromised devices IOC-simple under-performs
when the framework applies library interposition. In this particular case, IOC-simple
from genuine devices falls under the threshold, triggering false positive results. We
relate these results to higher random activity in the resource-limited compromised
devices’ kernel [16].
5.2.3 IOC-advanced. To overcome the previous limitation, we can apply the IOC-
advanced technique. By using this approach, our framework can obtain new call lists
with more deterministic behavior from the resource-limited devices and enhance the
statistical correlation between these type of devices and their corresponding GTP. In
Figure 4(b), the reader can observe how IOC values from resource-limited genuine
devices overcome the threshold mark while the compromised devices are still under
the borderline. ere exists a trade-o between the amount of randomness that can
be removed from system call lists without impacting the decision process. If the value
of h is too signicant, critical behavioral information can also be potentially removed
from the call lists, limiting the performance of the decision algorithm in cases where
tasks T are too simple.
5.3 Performance Metrics
To further measure the ecacy of our detection methods, we calculate the standard
performance metrics of accuracy, recall, precision, and specicity. ese metrics are
dened in Equations 14, 15, 16, and 17:
ACC =
(TP +TN )
(TP +TN + FP + FN ) , (14)
REC =
TP
(TP + FN ) , (15)
PREC =
TP
(TP + FP ) , (16)
Spec =
TN
(TN + FP ) . (17)
where TP stands for true positive or the case where a compromised device is decided
as compromised; TN stands for true negative or the case where a genuine device is
decided as genuine; FP stands for false positive or the case where a genuine device is
decided as compromised; and nally FN stands for false negative or the case where
a compromised device is decided as genuine. First, we evaluate the performance of
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our framework with IOC-simple. en, the improved results are shown aer applying
IOC-advanced.
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Fig. 5. Figures compare the performance of the IOC-simple algorithm on six dierent types of
compromised devices aer using library interposition and ptrace: (a) Accuracy, (b) Recall.
In Figure 5(a), we evaluate the overall accuracy of our detection techniques over the
six dierent types of compromised devices. Since accuracy comprisesTP andTN results,
this metric describes how well the framework can positively decide between genuine
and compromised devices without errors. In general, for ptrace, our framework
achieves an excellent accuracy performance (between 0.95 to 1) for all types of devices.
However, this analysis also reveals the performance limitations of the framework for
detecting resource-limited compromised devices in the case of library interposition
(top-right case in Figure 5(a)). Here, the framework achieves a low accuracy value of
0.5.
In Figure 5(b), we evaluate the overall recall performance of the framework. In
this case, recall metrics show how well our framework detects the six dierent types
of compromised devices. Based on these results, the reader can observe that the
framework achieves the maximum recall (maximum value of TP s) for the selected
threshold β = 0.6. In the case of resource-rich devices, recall performance was high
for all the threshold values. On the other hand, for resource-limited devices, we can
notice low recall values for reats 2 and 3 when the threshold values are under 0.6
for the case of library interposition.
Figure 6(a) depicts the precision evaluation. Precision values represent the statistical
relationship between the number of successfully detected compromised devices against
the number of times that the framework fails to correctly decide a device as genuine. By
looking at the precision results, one can observe that our framework under-performs
in the case of library interposition for resource-limited devices.
Finally, we utilize specicity metrics to evaluate the true negative rate, that is, how
eectively our framework discriminates genuine devices. In Figure 6(b) (top right), one
can observe that, for the case of resource-limited devices with library interposition,
the framework achieves very low specicity. ese results limit the application of
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Fig. 6. Figures compare the performance of the IOC-simple algorithm on six dierent types of
compromised devices aer using library interposition and ptrace: (a) Precision, (b) Specificity.
IOC-simple to decide on this particular type of devices. Specicity value of 0 at β
threshold between 0.45 and 0.7 demonstrates that a device was not correctly decided
as genuine in this case. However, in all the remaining three cases, the framework
performs very well.
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Fig. 7. Performance metrics aer applying IOC-advanced for the detection of resource-limited
devices when library interposition is utilized: (a) Accuracy, (b) Recall, (c) Precision, and (d)
Specificity.
By analyzing the results in Figures 5 and 6, one can compare the performance of
the proposed framework on resource-limited and resource-rich devices for the two
hooking techniques applied. Most evaluation metrics diminish their performance
when the framework applies the IOC-simple algorithm to detect resource-limited
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devices using library interposition. ese results reect on the fact that for this
type of devices, a more robust detection mechanism is necessary. To improve these
results, we utilize the framework with the IOC-advanced algorithm. Figure 7 depicts
the improvements in all the performance metrics aer applying IOC-advanced for
compromised resource-limited devices with library interposition. In this gure, one
can observe that the correlation threshold of 0.6 provided the best results overall for
this particular testbed. Also, the framework obtained signicant improvements in
accuracy and precision if compared with the case of IOC-simple (accuracy improved
from 0.5 to 0.96, and precision improved from 0.5 to 0.93). Finally, recall metrics
retained its high performance at the selected threshold value (recall = 1).
5.4 System overhead
We expect our framework to perform with high accuracy and scalability without
introducing too much overhead. Table 4 summarizes the average of system overhead
on resource-limited and resource-rich devices. e metrics RT , ST , UT , Mem, and
CPU correspond to the values of real-time, system-time, user-time, memory, and CPU,
respectively. In this table, NF (No Framework) represents the case where devices
were evaluated without applying our the proposed framework, and WF (With Frame-
work) represents the cases where we evaluated the performance while applying the
framework. Additionally, LI represents the cases where we applied library interposi-
tion. Finally, R-R refers to resource-rich devices, and R-L refers to resource-limited
devices. Results in Table 4 demonstrate that the utilization of the detection framework
does not introduce signicant overhead on the devices. Particularly, in the case of
resource-limited devices, the framework utilizes 0.03% more of memory (out of the
total memory available in the devices) and 1.9% more of the CPU. For resource-rich
devices, the framework utilizes 0.001% more of memory (out of the total memory
available on the device) and an almost negligible amount of CPU. In summary, for
both resource-limited and resource-rich devices, library interposition introduces the
most overhead to the system. However, this overhead is considerably low if compared
with similar applications proposed in the literature [25, 76].
Table 4. Average system overhead on resource-rich and resource-limited devices aer using
the framework.
Metrics NF WF
value value ptrace (%) LI (%)
R-R R-L R-R R-L R-R R-L
RT (s) 60.00 60.11 0.05 3.8 0.01 0.1
ST (s) 0.49 3.60 8.1 3.6 10.2 5.5
UT (s) 0.31 0.49 16.1 0.31 6.4 2.0
Mem (KB) 1967.5 1827.5 1.1e-3 4.3e-5 3.0e-2 1.0e-3
CPU (%) 1 6.02 0 1.9 0 1
To further study the impact of our framework, we analyzed this overhead consid-
ering a real resource-limited smart grid device. In Table 5, we summarize the main
specications of Remote Terminal Unit RT2020. Looking at Table 5, we can conclude
that for the worst case of resource utilization (library interposition on a resource-
limited device), the increment in execution time because of the use of our framework
would only represent up to 2.3 cycle times. Additionally, our framework would only
take 0.1% of the total memory of a real resource-limited smart grid device.
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Table 5. Specification values for Remote Terminal Unit RT2020 [33].
Item Specication Values
Processor Dual Core ARM A9 667 MHz
Dynamic Memory (RAM) 128 MB
Program Memory (Flash) 4 MB
Nonvolatile Memory 4 Mb
Real Time Clock Resolution 1 ms
Execution Cycle Time ≤ 100 ms
5.5 Benefits and Features
ere are several benets associated with the design of our framework:
(1) Excellent detection rate: the proposed framework demonstrated an excellent
rate for the detection of compromised smart grid devices by combining three
dierent detection methods: system and function call comparison, IOC-simple,
and IOC-advanced.
(2) Minimum overhead: the proposed framework does not represent signicant
overhead on the use of computing resources.
(3) Specic vs. generic solution: the proposed framework is designed to address the
specic problem of compromised smart grid device detection. e adversary
and system model proposed in this work follow the security requirements and
architecture characteristics of the smart grid. However, the approaches pro-
posed here for the detection of compromised smart grid devices are perfectly
suitable for other CPS security domains outside the smart grid domain.
(4) Comprehensive adversary model: the adversary model used in this work con-
siders both resource-limited and resource-rich compromised devices. Also, it
combines three dierent threats aecting the smart grid.
(5) Compromised device diversity: Our framework is suitable for a great range of
dierent compromised devices. e design of our system-level framework
makes it also suitable for detecting hardware counterfeiting [1, 12, 27] as
observed from the system level. System and function call comparison and sta-
tistical techniques are powerful tools capable of detecting changes in hardware
and system conguration. is makes our framework an appealing solution
to monitor and detect a wide range of dierent types of compromised devices.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present the related work. ere are several works studying security
challenges in the smart grid [49, 74, 80, 83]. In general, cyberaacks against smart grid
are categorized into four dierent groups: denial of services (DoS) aacks, malicious
data injection aacks, trac analysis aacks, and high-level application aacks [83].
In [21], [84], [3], and [9], the authors provide several examples of DoS aacks impacting
dierent parts of the smart grid architecture. Most of these aacks are executed from
compromised hosts, servers, and devices inside the smart grid.
Malicious data injection aacks are analyzed in [21, 48, 73]. One compelling case is
studied in [90]. In this paper, the authors analyze four dierent types of aacks in the
state estimation process and examine the least-eort data injection aack to nd the
optimal aack vector.
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In the case of trac analysis aacks, authors in [77] describe how an aacker can
monitor and intercept the frequency and timing of transmied messages to deduce
information and user’s behavior. In [62], high-level application aacks are described
as the way an aacker can disrupt the essential functions of a power system (i.e., state
estimation and power ow measurement).
In general, these are all useful studies, but none of them directly covers the threat of
compromised devices in the smart grid. Additionally, in cases where the aackers rely
on the use and control of compromised smart grid devices to perform the aacks, only
one type of smart grid threat was considered at a time. In this work, our adversary
model considers a combination of 3 dierent threats impacting the smart grid combined
with 2 dierent device resource availability.
Smart grid compromised device detection: In general, the topic of compromised
devices has not been extensively studied in the literature. In most cases, researchers
focus on proposing anomaly detection mechanisms [51] for dierent types of aacks
in the smart grid [24, 30, 66, 78], without particularizing on the aack sources (e.g.,
compromised devices). In a few cases, however, the behavior of the smart grid device
is considered. In [88], the authors study the minimal number of compromised sensor
that can be used to manipulate a given number of smart grid states eectively. Further,
they consider the optimal PMU placement to defend against this type of data integrity
aacks. Some works have been proposed in other CPS and industrial environments.
In [61], the authors propose a vector-valued model-based cumulative sum procedure
to identify compromised sensors in CPS. Even though this work achieves promising
results in simulation environments, its threat model only considers false data injection
aacks. Also, no results are shown on the overhead introduced to the CPS devices,
essential to consider suitable security applications for real-time critical infrastructures
like the smart grid. In a dierent approach, integrity measurement and aestation
systems have been proposed to evaluate the integrity of applications in CPS and the
Internet of ings (IoT) devices [11, 15, 19, 20, 57, 67]. Also, the authors in [82] apply
aestation approaches to detect comprised devices in the CPS. In this work, however,
they utilize stimulant-response mechanisms to detect compromised devices based on
their specic reaction to controlled inputs, which can also be impractical for the smart
grid and results can depend on several undesired networks’ and physical channels’
dynamics. Other relevant works propose similar aestation approaches [14, 55] to
detect aacks in CPS. However, these works focus on building models of the entire
CPS network instead of focusing on individual devices, which impacts the overhead
and the general performance of the proposed solutions. Finally, most of these works
apply to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and are not directly applicable to the smart
grid domain. Finally, in more general approaches, some works proposes the use of
data collected from devices to detect malicious operations or specic behavior [2, 5].
Intelligent, secure packaging, outbound beaconing, and beer tracking systems are
some of the countermeasures that are being proposed to prevent the introduction of
compromised devices in the smart grid supply chain [18, 58, 85]. However, skilled
aackers could have remote access to legitimate devices (e.g., RTUs, PMUs, and IEDs)
outside the supply chain and create opportunities for tampering smart grid devices in
the eld.
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Function and system call tracing techniques for security applications: function and sys-
tem call tracing techniques constitute a powerful method for regulating and monitoring
applications behaviour [7, 8, 47], so they have been largely used in security applica-
tions [26]. System and function call tracing techniques can be found in applications
like intrusion detection and connement [43], binary detection of OS functions [34],
sandboxing [50], and soware portable packages [28]. Specically, in [22], the authors
use system call tracing to implement intrusion detection systems (IDS). Also, in [25]
and [60], the authors proposed anomaly detection mechanism based on information
obtained from system calls behavior analysis. In these cases, the implementation of
the security tools resulted too heavy in terms of system overhead. One similar appli-
cation with improved system overhead can be found in [76]. In this case, the proposed
solution is required to run continuously and serves the purpose of complementing
antivirus soware.
Dierence from existing work: Our framework is dierent from other discussed
solutions which, in most cases, focus on specic threats to the smart grid instead of
considering multiple types of threats acting on dierent type of devices (e.g., resource-rich
and resource-limited). As discussed, there are also cases where dierent approaches are
used for the detection of compromised devices and/or monitoring application behavior.
Only in a few of these cases, the solution is intended to be applied in the smart grid
domain. In addition, to succeed, these solutions need to monitor constantly-changing
environments like network trac and computational systems or need to challenge the
devices with specic inputs to study their response, which constitutes a limitation in
terms of system overhead, resource utilization, and real-time analysis. Dierently, our
framework has a simpler model and is lightweight in terms of system overhead while
providing excellent detection rate of the compromised smart grid devices while they
are performing typical real-time CPS operations. Also, we propose a congurable
framework for both the supply chain and the smart grid operation eld which is
envisioned friendly and adaptive enough to be easily applied either within supply
chain testing scenarios and while the devices are performing real-time operations
inside the smart grid infrastructure. Finally, our work can also complement the existing
security mechanisms in the smart grid domain with its open-source and congurable
nature.
7 CONCLUSIONS
e smart grid vision depends on the secure and reliable two-way communications
between smart devices (e.g., IEDs, PLCs, PMUs). Nonetheless, compromised smart
grid devices constitute a serious threat to a healthy and secure distribution of data in
the grid. In this work, we designed a system-level congurable framework capable
of monitoring and detecting compromised smart grid devices. Our framework com-
bines system and function call tracing techniques (i.e., ptrace, library interposition),
signal processing, and statistical analysis (basic and advanced) to detect compromised
device behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work that utilizes
these techniques in detecting compromised devices in the smart grid. Moreover, we
evaluated the performance of our framework on six dierent types of compromised
devices, conforming to realistic smart grid scenarios. Such devices exchanged smart
grid GOOSE messages utilizing an open-source version of the IEC61850 protocol suite.
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Specically, we analyzed the ecacy of our framework under six dierent adversarial
seings aecting devices with dierent resource availability. Experimental results
demonstrated that our framework successfully detects dierent types of compromised
device behavior in a variety of dierent environments with high accuracy. Also, our
performance analysis reveals that the use of the proposed detection framework yield
minimal overhead on the smart grid devices’ computing resources.
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